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CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
CAN IT PROTECT PRIVATE FIGURES FROM THE
UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF
CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL INFORMATION?
Gary Williams
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical. The Editor-in-Chief of the
fictional Los Angeles Herald Express ("Express") decides her paper should
print something to increase public awareness about HIV and AIDS.' Her
purpose is to reduce the "public ignorance and hysteria" about the disease.
She directs her staff to do a series of stories about "ordinary people coping
with AIDS or HIV."
The staff members do an excellent job. They produce a series of ten
articles. Each article describes one person and his or her daily struggle to
cope with HIV. Accurate, sensitive, and moving, the articles were a
tremendous success and generated favorable public reaction.
At the end of the series, the Express runs an editorial urging people to
learn more about HIV and AIDS. The editorial encourages people to
replace their superstitions and fears with knowledge about the disease, its
effects, and how it can be contracted. It suggests people write letters to
California's governor urging him to sign legislation prohibiting housing
and employment discrimination against persons infected with HIV or
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. B.A., magna cum laude, 1973,
University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1976, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Shelan
Joseph and Gary Austin for their invaluable research assistance. I also want to acknowledge the
excellent editing assistance of the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Journal. In particular, I thank Shana Weiss for her gentle yet insistent prodding, and Scott
McPhee for his patience, input, and assistance.
1. I have used this hypothetical as part of a moot court exercise in my class, Libel, Slander
and the First Amendment, for the past three years. I thank the members of those classes, whose
creative ideas and passionate input on the issue of privacy have greatly enhanced my thoughts
on the subject.
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suffering from AIDS. After the editorial appeared, the governor's office
received over 5,000 letters urging him to sign the legislation (which he
signed).
Seven subjects from the series agreed the Express could publicize
their stories. Dr. Susan Eldrid e, a popular pediatrician favorably profiled
in the series, did not consent. Dr. Eldridge contracted HIV through an
accident in an operating room. She had carefully concealed her illness,
revealing it only to her spouse and her personal physician. While
researching the series, the Express received a call from a confidential
source. The source stated "I think people should know their children's
doctor has AIDS." The source then identified Dr. Eldridge and provided
sufficient corroborating information to lead reporters to believe the story
might be true.
The Editor instructed a reporter to verify the accuracy of the
information from the confidential source. The reporter contacted Dr.
Eldridge and asked if she had AIDS. Dr. Eldridge informed the reporter
she had not authorized the release of her medical records or information to
anyone, and that she would not discuss her physical condition or the
contents of her records. She told the reporter she would consider any
publication of her medical condition, history, or records a violation of her
privacy.
Informed of this exchange, the Editor told the reporter the Express
would not run the story without verification. The reporter then told the
confidential source the story would not be published unless there was some
reliable confirmation of the allegation. The source produced a copy of Dr.
Eldridge's blood test report stating she was HIV-positive, along with
copies of her personal physician's medical records showing Dr. Eldridge
was receiving treatment for the HIV infection. The reporter verified that
the report and records were authentic. The newspaper never encouraged
the source to acquire Dr. Eldridge's records, nor did it pay the source for
the information or the records.
The Editor-in-Chief, after lengthy discussions with her staff and
attorneys, decided to publish the Eldridge story. She reasoned that the
information was true, and that the Express obtained it lawfully. The Editor
decided that publishing the information about Dr. Eldridge was in the
public interest; Dr. Eldridge was a beloved physician and a community
asset who had contracted IHV through no fault of her own. Publishing the
story, the editor believed, would counteract some of the homophobia
2. The ninth and tenth persons will be discussed in future articles exploring the right to
privacy of public figures and public officials.
CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
surrounding HIV and AIDS because Dr. Eldridge was a heterosexual,
married woman. The Editor concluded publication of the Eldridge profile
would enhance the emotional impact and educational value of the Express
series.
After the Express published the article, Dr. Eldridge immediately
sent a letter to her patients' parents. The letter acknowledged Dr. Eldridge
was HIV-positive, and explained she had always taken the precautionary
measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control to prevent
accidental transmission of HIV to her patients. Unfortunately, Dr.
Eldridge's practice quickly withered away. The majority of her patients'
parents refused to bring their children to her. Four parents sued her for
"concealing" the information about her illness. Eventually, Dr. Eldridge
sold what remained of her practice to a friend at a severely discounted
price. Dr. Eldridge has no job and no other immediate prospects.
May Dr. Eldridge sue the Express for publicizing her HIV-positive
status? Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that the Supreme Court has
not confronted the Eldridge scenario: where recovery is sought because
the press has published confidential information obtained from private
sources.3 This Article explores that possibility.
Part II of this Article sets up the Express' argument: publication of
lawfully-obtained, truthful information about IV, a matter of paramount
public importance, is protected by the First Amendment. Part I also
summarizes the inherent tension between the right to privacy and the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Further, Part II explains
that each time the Supreme Court has heard a case involving a clash
between privacy and freedom of the press, the Court has ruled against the
right to privacy. The majority and concurring opinions in Florida Star v.
B.J.F.4 have led many legal commentators to conclude that a claim of a
violation of the right to privacy can never succeed because of the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
Part III of this Article considers the clash between privacy and
freedom of the press through the prism of California's constitutional right
to privacy. California's constitutional right to privacy creates an
independent cause of action with its own standards for violation and
recovery. California courts have an extensive history of interpreting the
scope and meaning of the constitutional right to privacy, and balancing
that right against federal constitutional rights, other state constitutional
3. "The issue that the Supreme Court never has faced is whether liability for invasion of
privacy is permissible when the information is obtained from private sources." ERWIN
CHEMEISKY, CONSrrrtrnONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 865 (1997).
4. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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rights, and competing compelling interests.5  Part IV discusses how
California's treatment of the constitutional right to privacy satisfies the
criteria outlined by the majority opinion in Florida Star. It also explains
why protection of the right to privacy is especially appropriate and
important where medical information is involved.
Finally, Part V explains why California courts should continue to
strike a balance between the right to privacy and freedom of the press,
allowing Dr. Eldridge to recover damages for the publication of her
confidential medical information. California's constitutional standard for
identifying information protected by the right to privacy establishes a clear
boundary where the right to privacy begins. This clear boundary removes
any argument that California's protection of the right to privacy has an
impermissible chilling effect on freedom of the press.
II. THE STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Two United States Supreme Court cases have directly addressed the6
clash between the right to privacy and freedom of the press. The first
case to come before the Court was Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn.7 A reporter
attended court proceedings for the six defendants accused of raping and
killing Cynthia Cohn.8 The reporter obtained the name of the victim by
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. While this Article discusses California law, it has potentially
wider application. Eight other states have elevated the right to privacy to constitutional status.
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7. The principles discussed and analyzed here are potentially applicable in each
of these states. Moreover, the sources from which the principles of privacy are drawn are
common to most other states pursuant to their common law or statutory protection of privacy.
6. The Court discussed in passing the right to privacy and the First Amendment in Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In note seven to the Court's majority opinion, Justice Brennan
observed that the common law protection of reporting on "newsworthy persons" is not
unlimited. Id. at 383 n.7. He noted that cases have held that revelations may be so intimate and
unwarranted that they outrage the community's notions of decency. Id. In considering that
possibility, Brennan declared, "This case presents no question whether truthful publication of
such matter could be constitutionally proscribed." Id.
In Oklahoma Publ 'g v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court briefly touched on
this issue in a per curiam decision. There the press learned the identity of a juvenile defendant
while attending a detention hearing for the minor, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
juvenile court. Id. Pictures of the minor, and his name, were widely published and broadcast
following that hearing. Id. Before the trial, the trial court ordered the media not to publish the
name or photograph of the minor. Id. The Court held that the state could not prohibit the
publication of the name of a juvenile under these circumstances. Id. at 311-12.
7. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
8. Id. at 472.
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examining the indictments, which were made available by the clerk of the
court.9  The reporter also heard the victim's name during the court
proceedings.10  The reporter then broadcast the victim's name on the
television news.II
A Georgia statute made publication or broadcasting the name or
identity of a rape victim a misdemeanor. 12 Cynthia Cohn's father sued the
reporter and the station, claiming that the broadcast violated his right to
privacy.' 3 The plaintiff's claim relied in part upon the Georgia statute.
The publisher admitted broadcasting the name, but claimed the broadcast
was protected under the First Amendment. 14
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on
liability, and reserved the issue of damages for a jury. On appeal, the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the decision, concluding that the right to
privacy and freedom of press could coexist. 
15
The defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court acknowledged the importance of the right to privacy, stating that
"powerful arguments can be made... that... there is a zone of privacy
surrounding every individual, a zone within which the State may protect
him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity."'
16
At the same time, the Court noted the inherent tension between
privacy and freedom of the press. In discussing the private facts tort
asserted by the plaintiff and vigorously defended by the State of Georgia,
the Court observed this tort most directly confronts the freedoms of speech
and press. 17 The Court declined an invitation from the press to decide
whether the states could "ever define and protect an area of privacy free
from unwanted publicity in the press. The Court explained its
reluctance was due to the fact that interests on both sides are "plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society."
19
Instead, the Court decided the states may not impose sanctions on the
accurate publication of information obtained from public records. 20 In
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 473-74.
12. Id. at 471-72 (discussing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)).
13. Cox, 420 U.S. at 474.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 475 (citing Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971)).
16. Id. at 487.
17. Id. at 489.
18. Id. at 491.
19. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491.
20. Id. at 469.
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explaining its decision, the Court made a number of points about the
importance to the public of the type of information released by Cox
Broadcasting. First, the Court focused on the role of the press in informing
the public of the workings of government. Specifically, the Court noted
that when the press reports on criminal trials, it functions as a guarantor of
fairness and brings to bear public scrutiny of the administration of
justice. 22 In reaching this conclusion, the Court declared: "The
commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial
proceedings arising from the prosecutions, however, are without question
events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the
responsibility of the press to report the operations of government."
23
The Court next visited the clash between privacy and the First
Amendment in Florida Star v. B.J.F.24 This case, like Cox, involved a
woman who was raped.25  She reported the crime to the police, who
inadvertently included her name in a report made readily available to the
press.26 A reporter from the Florida Star, a weekly newspaper serving
Jacksonville, Florida, obtained the report and included the full name of the
victim in an article.
27
A Florida statute made it unlawful to print the name of a victim of a
sexual offense "in any instrument of mass communication." 28 B.J.F. filed
suit against the newspaper and the police department, alleging they
negligently violated the Florida statute.29  The newspaper was found
civilly liable for printing the name of the plaintiff, and the jury awarded
her $75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.
30
21. Id. at 487.
22. Id. at 491-92.
23. Id. at 492. The Court further declared:
Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the
administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting
of the true contents of the records by the media. The freedom of the press to
publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of
government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of
public business. In preserving that form of government the First and Fourteenth
Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose sanctions
on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open
to public inspection.
Id. at 495.
24. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
25. Id. at 527.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 526-27.
28. Id. at 526 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN § 794.03 (West 1987)).
29. Id. at 528.
30. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528-29.
CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The newspaper appealed, claiming the judgment and the Florida
statute upon which it was based violated the First Amendment. 3 1  The
Supreme Court agreed. Once again, the Court refused to declare that
publication of true information can never be sanctioned consistent with the
First Amendment.32 The majority explained it "continue[s] to believe that
the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes
between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the
instant case.' 33  Instead, the Court relied upon a principle announced in
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.3 4 to resolve the case. That principle is
succinct: "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order."
35
The Court's application of this standard in Florida Star is instructive.
Its first inquiry was whether the information published was "lawfully
obtained."3  The opinion explains that the government can forbid the
nonconsensual acquisition of sensitive private information, thereby
bringing publication of such information outside of the Daily Mail
principle. The Court said this power gives the government ample means
to safeguard privacy interests without punishing publication.
38
31. Id.
32. Id. at 533.
33. Id.
34. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). Daily Mail is often mentioned as a right to privacy case. See, e.g.,
Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private Facts Tort: The End Is Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 225, 235-36
(1991); Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted By the Ghost of Justice Black, 68
TEX. L. REV. 247, 249 (1990). Indeed, Justice Marshall's opinion refers to Daily Mail as one of
a trilogy of Supreme Court cases presenting "the conflict between truthful reporting and state-
protected privacy interests." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 530.
Daily Mail is not, strictly speaking, a privacy case. In Daily Mail, the Court ruled on a
challenge to a West Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor to publish the name of a minor
charged as a youthful offender. The interest advanced by the state in defense of its statute was
to protect the anonymity of the juvenile in furtherance of his rehabilitation. Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 104.
35. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103, quoted in Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
36. The "lawfully obtained" standard is cogently criticized by Professor Sean Scott in her
article The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 72 WASH. L. REV. 683, 698-99 (1996).
She points out that use of this broad standard in its most expansive guise could indeed be the
death knell for the right to privacy. Id.
37. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
38. Id.
1997]
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The second Daily Mail inquiry asks whether the published
information concerns a matter of "public significance." 39 In Florida Star,
the Court found the article addressed a matter of "paramount Lublic
import[ance]:" the commission and investigation of a violent crime.
The third inquiry asks if the limitation furthers a state interest of "the
highest order."41 The State of Florida advanced three interests served by
its statute: protecting the privacy of the victim of a sexual assault;
protecting the physical safety of the victim; and encouraging victims to
report sexual assault crimes without fear of public exposure. The Court
agreed these were interests "of the highest order.' 43 It found, however, the
statute failed to satisfy this prong because the method Florida chose to
advance those interests was flawed."
The opinion singled out three failings that doomed the statute. First,
the government itself was the source of the information published.4 5 Even• • , • 46
though release of the victim's name was accidental, the majority held
allowing liability to be imposed where the press relied on a government
news release would lead to self-censorship. The second deficiency was
the statute's imposition of liability under a negligence per se standard.
Liability could follow a finding of publication even if the plaintiff's name
was already known to the public.
48
39. Id. at 536 (quoting Daily Mail, 433 U.S. at 103).
40. Id. at 536-37.
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537.
43. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 433 U.S. at 103).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 538.
46. The dissent chronicled that the accident was mitigated by the police department, when
they correspondingly posted signs in the press room, advising reporters that names of rape
victims were not matters of public record and were not to be reported. Id. at 546. The reporter
acknowledged she understood she was not supposed to take down the victim's name. Id.
The failure of the majority opinion to address this distinction is dissatisfying. It cites the
timidity and self censorship the press might exhibit if it can be punished for publicizing
information the government has provided in a news release, then says: "The government's
issuance of such a release, without qualification, can only convey to recipients that the
government considered dissemination lawful, and indeed expected the recipients to disseminate
the information further." Id. at 538-39. Given the facts noted in the dissent, it can hardly be
argued that the Florida Star thought the police department considered dissemination of the
victim's name to be "lawful," or that it expected the police department to report her name to the
public.
47. Id. at 538.
48. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539.
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The Court's final objection was that the Florida statute was
underinclusive.49 This undermined the State's claim that the statute served
an interest of "the highest order."50 This objection was forcefully voiced
by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion. His comments, which amplify
the concerns of the majority on this point, bear repeating:
[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the
highest order,' and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful
speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly
vital interest unprohibited .... This law has every appearance
of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon the
press but not upon itself.5 '
The decision in Florida Star prompted the dissent to eulogize the
right to privacy. The dissenters argued that by invalidating the Florida
statute in the face of the arguments made, "the Court accepts appellant's
invitation to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the
20th Century: the tort of the publication of private facts. Even if the
Court's opinion does not say as much today, such obliteration will follow
inevitably from the Court's conclusion here."
52
III. PRIVACY AND THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
To paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the death of privacy have
been greatly exaggerated. Professor Sean Scott has chronicled a series of
cases decided post-Florida Star where courts have found publication of
highly sensitive personal information actionable. 53 The judiciary is likely
motivated by an innate sense that there must be some sphere of privacy to
which people are entitled to protect themselves from public exposure.
That sense was expressed by the Ninth Circuit in an opinion written before
Florida Star. In Virgil v. Time, Inc., 54 the court posed the question:
49. Id. at 540.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 541-42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Many legal commentators writing
about the Florida Star decision agree. See Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted
by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1195 (1990); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for
a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291
(1983); Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private Facts Tort: The End is Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 299
(1991).
53. Scott, supra note 36, at 696-98.
54 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976), cited in Florida Star,
491 U.S. at 552 (White, J., dissenting).
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Does the spirit of the Bill of Rights require that individuals be
free to pry into the unnewsworthy private affairs of their
fellowmen? In our view it does not. In our view fairly defined
areas of privacy must have the protection of law if the quality of
life is to continue to be reasonably acceptable. The public's
right to know is, then, subject to reasonable limitations so far as
concerns the private facts of its individual members.
5
A. California's Constitutional Right to Privacy
California voters endorsed the judiciary's belief that fairly defined
areas of privacy must receive legal protection when they elevated the right
to privacy to constitutional status. In 1972, California voters amended
Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution to declare privacy one of
the inalienable rights of California citizens.
56
In White v. Davis,57 the California Supreme Court observed that the
primary purpose of the constitutional amendment was to provide
protection against the encroachment on personal freedom caused by
increased surveillance and data collection. Citing the ballot argument in
favor of the amendment as its legislative history, the court declared voters
wished to give individuals the ability to control circulation of personal
information.5 9  The White opinion identified four princ~al problems the
constitutional guarantee of privacy was created to solve. Central to this
discussion was the voters' desire to protect against the improper use of
information properly obtained for a specific purpose.
61
California's Supreme Court, relying on the ballot argument,
recognized voters viewed the new constitutional right to be a "fundamental
interest., 62 The ballot argument in favor of the amendment declares: "The
right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and
55. 527 F.2d at 1128.
56. Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution now reads: "All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness andprivacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (emphasis added).
57. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
58. Id. at 233.
59. Id. at 234.
60. Id.
61. Id. The other problems the amendment addresses are government snooping, the
overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information, and the lack of a
reasonable check on the accuracy of those records. Id.
62. Id. at 233.
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compelling interest. ' 63  The White opinion noted that the amendment
created a legal and enforceable right to privacy for every Californian.
64
Recently, the court expanded on the source and nature of the right to
privacy in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n.65 The court again
stressed that a principal focus of the amendment was misuse and
dissemination of information gathered by public and private entities.
66
After surveying the case law and commentary on the common law tort of
invasion of privacy, the court concluded the constitutional right to privacy
is far broader in scope:
Our reference to the common law as background to the
California constitutional right to privacy is not intended to
suggest that the constitutional right is circumscribed by the
common law tort. The ballot arguments do not reveal any such
limitation. To the contrary, common law invasion of privacy by
public disclosure of private facts requires that the actionable
disclosure be widely published and not confined to a few
persons or limited circumstances. In contrast, the ballot
arguments describe a privacy right that 'prevents government
and business interests from collecting and stockpiling
unnecessary information about us or misusing information
gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to
embarrass us.' Obviously, sensitive personal information may
be misused even if its disclosure is limited.
67
The Hill opinion found that informational privacy-the right to
control access to sensitive personal information-is a core value protected
by the constitutional right to privacy.68  The opinion reiterates that the
constitutional right to privacy is self-executing, creating an independent
cause of action available against private parties as well as the
government.
69
Hill identifies three elements of a cause of action for violation of the
constitutional right to privacy. The first element is a legally cognizable
privacy interest. 7° One form of a legally cognizable privacy interest is the
63. White, 533 P.2d at 233. Subsequent California Supreme Court cases have referred to
the right to privacy as "fundamental." See Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695, 703 (Cal.
1985); Adamson v. Santa Barbara, 610 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1980).
64. White, 533 P.2d at 234.
65. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
66. Id. at 645.
67. Id. at 648-49 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 654.
69. Id. at 644.
70. Id. at 654.
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right to preclude the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential
personal information. 71 The court held information fits this description
when "well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize
individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified
embarrassment or indignity."72 These norms can be identified by referring
to "the usual sources of positive law . ..common law development,
constitutional development, statutory enactment, and the ballot arguments
accompanying the Privacy Initiative."
73
The second element of the constitutional claim is a reasonable
expectation of privacy on plaintiff's part.7 4 An individual's activities and
the customs, practices and settings of particular activities may create or
inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy. That expectation is determined
using an objective standard. The presence or absence of opportunities to
consent to an activity impacting privacy interests is a factor in determining
reasonableness.
75
The final element of a claim for violation of the constitutional right
to privacy is a showing that the invasion of privacy constitutes an
"egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right."' 76 The
Hill opinion stresses the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute.77
Where competing legitimate interests are present, they are balanced
against the constitutional right to privacy. Thus, privacy claims are subject
to one very important affirmative defense-invasions may be justified
where a legitimate competing interest is present. Conduct alleged to be an
invasion of privacy is evaluated based on the extent to which it furthers
78legitimate and important competing interests.
Thus, a defendant may defeat a constitutional privacy claim by
negating any of the three elements, or by pleading and proving the
invasion is justified by one or more countervailing interests. The plaintiff
can rebut the defense of countervailing interests by showing there are
feasible and effective alternatives to the defendant's conduct that have a
lesser impact on privacy.
79
71. Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
72. Id. The court noted these norms create a threshold reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id.
73. Id. at 654-55.
74. Id. at 655.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.
78. Id. at 655-56.
79. Id. at 657.
CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
B. Application of the California Constitutional Standard to the
Publication of Confidential Medical Information
How would Dr. Eldridge fare making a claim that the Express story
violated her state constitutional right to privacy? It is clear Dr. Eldridge
would be able to prove the existence of a legally protected privacy interest.
There is no question "established social norms," as defined by the
California Supreme Court, safeguard confidential medical information.
Two sources of positive law, constitutional development and statutory
enactments, make clear that a patient has a constitutionally protected
privacy interest in her confidential medical records.
California courts have long recognized the constitutional right to
privacy protects a patient's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
medical records. In Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini,
80
the court of appeal decided that the California Board of Medical Quality
Assurance could not gain unfettered access to the medical records of
patients of a physician charged with gross negligence and incompetence.
8 1
Instead, the court ruled the Board could only have access to those records
if it first produced a showing of good cause. 82  The court imposed this
limitation because "a person's medical profile is an area of privacy
infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many
areas already judicially recognized and protected."
83
The court then held that any incursion into that privacy must be
justified by a compelling interest. 84  The opinion acknowledged that a
state's interest in insuring the quality of health and medical care available
80. 93 Cal. App. 3d 669 (1979).
81. Id. at 669-70.
82. Id. at 680.
83. Id. at 678. The Gherardini opinion later explains why the individual interest in
protecting the privacy of a medical profile is so important:
The matters disclosed to the physician arise in most sensitive areas often difficult
to reveal even to the doctor. Their unauthorized disclosure can provoke more than
just simple humiliation in a fragile personality. The reasonable expectation that
such personal matters will remain with the physician are no less in a patient-
physician relationship than between the patient and psychotherapist. The
individual's right to privacy encompasses not only the state of his mind, but also
his viscera, detailed complaints of physical ills, and their emotional overtones.
The state of a person's gastro-intestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from
unauthorized public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the
contents of his library, or his membership in the NAACP. We conclude the specie
of privacy here sought to be invaded falls squarely within the protected ambit, the
expressed objectives of Article I, Section 1.
Id. at 679.
84. That portion of the holding is now in question, given some of the California Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Hill. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
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within its borders was compelling, and that individual medical records
may be relevant and material in furtherance of that purpose.8 5 This meant
disclosure could be compelled, but only upon a showing of good cause-
"a factual exposition of a reasonable ground for the sought order. '' 86
Subsequent cases reaffirm that medical records are a prototypical
example of personal information protected by the constitutional right to
privacy. In Urbaniak v. Newton,87 the California Court of Appeal held that
unauthorized disclosure of a patient's HIV-positive status violated the
constitutional right to privacy: "There can be no doubt that disclosure of
HIV-positive status may under appropriate circumstances be entitled to
protection under Section 1V'88 In Lantz v. Superior Court,89 the court
summarized the law regarding medical records and the constitutional right
to privacy: "Numerous reported decisions have recognized that a patient
has a privacy interest in a doctor's medical records pertaining to the
patient's physical or mental condition."
90
Four statutory enactments demonstrate that "established social
norms" protect the privacy of confidential medical records. In 1981, the
California Legislature enacted the Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act.9 1 In creating this protection, the Legislature made its intention clear:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that persons receiving
health care services have a right to expect that the
confidentiality of individual identifiable medical information
derived by health service providers be reasonably preserved. It
is the intention of the Legislature in enacting this act, to provide
for the confidentiality of individually identifiable medical
information, while permitting certain reasonable and limited
uses of that information.
9 2
To ensure individual medical information remains confidential, the
statute precludes health care providers from disclosing medical
information, 93 unless they receive permission from the patient.9 4  A
85. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 679.
86. Id. at 681.
87. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128 (1991).
88. Id. at 1140.
89. 28 Cal. App. 4th 1839 (1994).
90. Id. at 1853. The court then cites eight cases supporting this proposition. Id.
91. 1981 Cal. Stat. 782, § 1 (codified as amended at CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (Deering
1990)).
92. 1981 Cal. Stat. 782, § 1.
93. "Medical information" is defined broadly. It encompasses "any individually
identifiable information in possession of or derived from a provider of health care regarding a
patient's medical history, mental or physical condition, or treatment." CAL. CIV. CODE §
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medical care provider who discloses medical information without
permission is subject to civil and criminal penalties.95  California Civil
Code section 56.35 provides that a patient who suffers physical injury or
economic loss due to an unauthorized disclosure of medical information is
entitled to recover compensatory damages, limited punitive damages and
attorneys' fees. 96 The language of this statute does not limit the scope of
the remedy to the health care provider. Damages are arguably available
against any person who uses medical information in violation of the Act.
9 7
Civil Code section 56.36 makes any violation of section 56.10 that results
in personal injury or economic loss to the patient a misdemeanor. 9 8 The
statutes carefully provide for the form of authorization for release of
information.99 Specifically, they provide that third parties who receive
medical information through authorized release are also bound by the
confidentiality provisions.
California also has a statutory scheme protecting against the release
of test results for AIDS or HIV. Health and Safety Code section 120975
provides generally that "no person can be compelled, in any state, county,
city or other local, civil, criminal, administrative, legislative or other
proceeding to identify or provide identifying characteristics that would
identify any individual who is the subject of a blood test to detect
antibodies to the probable causative agent of AIDS."'
0'1
The Health and Safety Code law also provides that any person who
negligently discloses the results of an HIV test to any third party without
permission is subject to a civil penalty of $1,000, plus court costs, to be
56.05(b) (Deering 1990).
94. See id. § 56.10. This prohibition is subject to several exceptions, largely having to do
with litigation. Id. § 56.10(b)-(c). Those exceptions, and the treatment of them, will be
addressed more fully in the section on the California constitutional right to privacy. See
discussion infra Part IV.
95. See generally id. § 56.35.
96. Id.
97. The relevant language reads:
In addition to any other remedies available at law, a patient whose medical
information has been used or disclosed in violation of Section 56.10 or 56.20 or
subdivision (a) of 56.26 and who has sustained economic loss or personal injury
therefrom may recover compensatory damages, punitive damages not to exceed
three thousand dollars ($3,000), attorneys' fees not to exceed one thousand dollars
($1,000), and the costs of litigation.
Id. § 56.35.
98. California Civil Code section 56.36 provides: "Any violation of the provisions of this
part which results in economic loss or personal injury to a patient is punishable as a
misdemeanor." CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.36 (Deering 1990).
99. Id. §§ 56.11-56.12.
100. Id. §§ 56.13-56.26.
101. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 120975 (Deering 1990).
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paid to the subject of the test.'0 2 Any person who willfully discloses the
results of an HIV test to a third party in a manner that identifies the tested
person is subject to a civil penalty and is guilty of a misdemeanor.
10 3
California law prevents the unauthorized disclosure of medical
records during litigation. Section 1985.3 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a party seeking access to personal records of a
"consumer '1' 4 maintained by his or her physician 05 must take steps to
notify the consumer that those records are being sought.'0 6 The statute
allows the consumer to move to quash or modify the subpoena duces
tecum, and the person in possession of those records is not required to
produce them until the court has ruled on the motion to quash, or some
agreement has been reached on the production of the records.
10 7
An additional statutory source recognizing the importance of
maintaining the confidentiality of medical information is the physician-
patient privilege.10 8  The privilege is currently found in Evidence Code
sections 990-1007. 09 Expressed briefly, the physician-patient privilege
allows a patient to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any third party from
disclosing, any confidential communication between the patient and her
physician." 0
1. Application of the California Constitutional Standard
to the Dr. Eldridge Hypothetical
These constitutional interpretations and statutory enactments make
clear that "well established norms" recognize the need to maximize
individual control over confidential medical information."' 1 Under Hill,
102. Id. § 120980(a).
103. Id. § 120980(b)-(c).
104. "Consumer" is defined to include any individual. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1985.3(a)(2) (Deering 1990).
105. The statute also covers records kept by accountants, attorneys, bankers and other
fiduciaries. Id. § 1985.3(a)(1).
106. See id. § 1985.3(b).
107. Id. § 1985.3(g).
108. This privilege was first codified in California in 1872. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
98 (John William String ed., 4th ed. 1992). The original statute provided: "A licensed
physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as
to any information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to
prescribe or act for the patient." Id.
109. CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 990-1007 (Deering 1986).
110. This privilege is subject to some exceptions. See id. §§ 996-97, 999-1007. The most
notable exception is that there is no privilege in a criminal proceeding. Id. § 998.
111. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994).
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that means there is a legally cognizable privacy interest in confidential
medical information.
The second Hill inquiry asks whether the claimant has a reasonable
expectation of privacy." 2 In the Eldridge hypothetical, it is clear that she
had a subjective expectation of privacy, and that her expectation of privacy
was objectively reasonable. Dr. Eldridge is a private figure, who had not
in any way thrust herself into the public arena. She had not revealed her
illness to anyone except her spouse and her physician. The preceding
constitutional and statutory discussion"13 shows that the customs and
practices surrounding consultation with a physician create a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Finally, under Hill the court inquires whether the invasion of privacy
is sufficiently serious in its nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to
constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy
right."14 Gherardini, an early case holding confidential medical records
are protected by the constitutional right to privacy, recognized that
unauthorized public disclosure of medical records can have a devastating
personal impact." 5 The Gherardini opinion declared that a "patient
should be able to rest assured with the knowledge that 'the law recognizes
the communication [with his physician] as confidential and guards against
the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by
their subsequent disclosure."'
' 16
The deleterious impact of disclosing confidential medical
information spreads beyond the shame, humiliation, and loss of trust felt
by the patient. California courts have noted that protection of confidential
medical information serves important public interests as well. In
Gherardini, the court supported its ruling by noting that the physician-
patient privilege exists, in part, to encourage patients to disclose to their
physician all information necessary for diagnosis and treatment.
117
The goal of full disclosure is especially a matter of public interest in
the case of AIDS/HIV and other communicable diseases. In Urbaniak v.
Newton,118 the patient revealed to a physician's nurse that he was HIV-positive. 119 The physician later revealed that information to the lawyer
112. Id. at 655.
113. See supra Part III.A-B.
114. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.
115. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 679 (1979).
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 678-79.
118. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128 (1991).
119. Id. at 1128.
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representing the insurer handling plaintiff's workers' compensation case.
In turn, the lawyer sent copies of the report to the insurer, where it was
seen by at least seven of the insurer's employees. 120 The lawyer also sent
a copy of the report to the plaintiffs chiropractor. 121 Urbaniak sued,
claiming, among other things, that the disclosure of this information
violated his constitutional right to privacy.
122
The court of appeal held that while a tortious invasion of privacy
requires a "public disclosure," the constitutional guarantee allows a cause
of action where there is an improper use of information properly
obtained. 123  In holding that unauthorized disclosure would violate
Urbaniak's constitutional right to privacy, the court declared there is an
important public interest in encouraging confidential communications
within a professional relationship. 124  The court noted the special
significance of those communications:
In the field of health care, disclosure of information about a
patient constitutes "improper use" when it will subvert a public
interest favoring communication of confidential information by
violating the patient's reasonable expectations of privacy. We
find such a public interest here in a patient's disclosure of IV-
positive status for the purpose of alerting a health care worker
to the need for safety precautions. . . . [D]isclosure of a
patient's HIV-positive status has undoubted importance for
safety precautions in treatment.
125
It is clear that Dr. Eldridge could make out a prima facie case that the
Express' decision to publicize her medical condition invaded a sphere
protected by her constitutional right to privacy. The publication of
information about her medical condition invaded a legally-cognizable
privacy interest. She had an objective and subjective expectation of
privacy in her medical information, and its revelation caused an egregious
breach of the social norms underlying the right to privacy. Publication of
such information caused tremendous personal suffering, and also inflicted
a societal harm by adversely affecting patient confidence that their
personal medical information would not be publicly revealed.
Under Hill, the Express would assert the affirmative defense that
freedom of the press and the corresponding right of the public to know are
120. Id. at 1134.
121. Id. at 1135.
122. Id. at 1133.
123. Id. at 1138.
124. Urbaniak, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 1139.
125. Id. at 1140.
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compelling interests that outweigh Dr. Eldridge's right to privacy.
126
Three areas of law suggest that these interests, while compelling, would
not outweigh Dr. Eldridge's interest in maintaining the privacy of her
medical information.
The first area acknowledges the clash between the right to privacy
and freedom of the press or the public's right to know. For example, the
California Supreme Court case Briscoe v. Reader's Digest127 involved
publication of a story about a man who had been convicted of a felony
eleven years earlier. As a result, the plaintiff, who had since led an
exemplary life, became estranged from his daughter and his friends, who
had no knowledge of his past criminal history. The plaintiff sued the
magazine, alleging the publication of his name in the article was a tortious
invasion of his right to privacy. 128 The magazine defended the publication,
arguing for First Amendment protection because the publication was a
truthful account of a past crime.
The California Supreme Court noted the right to privacy is "bound to
clash with the right to disseminate information to the public." 129  The
Briscoe case required the court to consider the competing interests of the
rehabilitated felon's right to anonymity and the magazine's right to
identify him. 13  The court acknowledged the strong social interest in
reports on crimes, past and present. In fact, it held that the bulk of the
article, including the specific description of the defendant's crime, was
newsworthy. 13'
126. The majority opinion in Hill held that where an invasion of privacy is caused by a
private party, the compelling interest standard does not always apply. Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
However the opinion also held that "[w]here the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest
fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom
to pursue consensual familial relationships, a 'compelling interest' must be present to overcome
the vital privacy interest." Id. at 653.
Because unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information is an obvious
invasion of an interest vital to personal autonomy, it is assumed that the compelling interest
standard would be applied to the publication of Dr. Eldridge's medical information. See
generally Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 669; Urbaniak, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 1128. This
assumption is supported by Susan S. v. Israels, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1290 (1997), a case decided
after Hill. In Susan S., the court of appeal concluded that the unauthorized reading and
dissemination of mental health records by a stranger is "a serious invasion of [the person's]
privacy." Id. at 1299.
127. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
128. Id. at 35.
129. Id. at 37.
130. Id. at 43-44.
131. Id. at 39. The "newsworthiness" defense is problematic for the right to privacy. As
Professor Scott notes, it is so broad that virtually anything the press decides to print is, by
definition, "newsworthy." Scott, supra note 36, at 699-700.
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Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held the plaintiff's
complaint stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Concluding
publication of the plaintiff's name could be tortious, the court explained
that identification of the defendant in long past crimes serves little public
purpose.132 Indeed, the court opined that the only "public interest" served
by such identifications was "curiosity." 133 The court then proceeded to
explain the balance it struck in resolving the case:
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is
always difficult to declare that something may not be published.
But the great general interest in an unfettered press may at times
be outweighed by other great societal interests. As a people we
have come to realize that one of these societal interests is that of
protecting an individual's right to privacy. The right to know
and the right to have others not know are, simplistically
considered, irreconcilable. But the rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to
privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a
minimum of intrusion upon the other.
134
2. Balancing the Constitutional Right to Privacy Against the State Interest
of Ascertaining the Truth in Other Areas of the Law
Another California case addressing the balance between the
guarantee of freedom of the press and an individual's interest in keeping
confidential information private is Diaz v. Oakland Tribune.135  In that
case a newspaper revealed that the student body president of a local
college was a transsexual who had undergone a sex-change operation.
136
132. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 39.
133. Id. at 42.
134. Id. It must be noted that Briscoe in some ways appears to be limited to its facts. The
Supreme Court also discussed a concomitant interest of the State in rehabilitating criminals and
encouraging to become productive law-abiding citizens. Id. at 43. In a subsequent case,
Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980), the California Supreme Court observed:
Most important to our decision [in Briscoe], however, was the fact that the state
has a compelling interest in the rehabilitative process and that a continuing threat
of media disclosure of the identity of past criminals is counterproductive to this
process. This additional interest, when pooled with the privacy and First
Amendment interests, swung the pendulum in privacy's favor.
Id. at 726. The opinion goes on to describe with approval lower court cases refusing to apply
Briscoe to other fact situations.
135. 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (1983).
136. Id. at 124.
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The plaintiff had scrupulously endeavored to keep information about her
medical status secret.
While the court of appeal reversed and remanded the case due to
faulty jury instructions, it confirmed the right to privacy can outweigh the
press' right to publish true facts in an appropriate case. 138  After
articulating that some reports invading an individual's privacy are
protected if they are newsworthy, the court of appeal held this privilege is
not unlimited: "Where the publicity is so offensive as to constitute a
'morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake,.. .' it
serves no legitimate public interest and is not deserving of protection."'
139
The second area where a California court has balanced a federal
constitutional right with the right to privacy involves a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. In
Susan S. v. Israels,140 a criminal defense attorney representing a defendant
charged with sexual battery read the confidential mental health records of
the alleged victim.'14  Subsequently, the attorney forwarded those records
to the defense psychiatrist and used the information in the records to cross
examine the victim, knowing the records were confidential. 1
42
The victim sued the attorney and his client, alleging the review and
use of her confidential mental health records violated her constitutional
right to privacy. 143 In determining whether the criminal defendant was
entitled to review the victim's records, the court of appeal balanced his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation against her right to privacy.144 To
prevail, the court held, the criminal defendant must first show good cause
for the discovery of the records.145 Even with a showing of good cause,the plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy would be overridden "only if
137. Id. at 123.
138. Id. at 127-33.
139. Diaz, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 126 (quoting Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th
Cir. 1975)). Diaz does not address the constitutional right to privacy. The opinion proceeds
under the principles of the common law tort. Id. Thus, the limitations discussed in that opinion
should not be applied to the constitutional protection of privacy.
140. 55 Cal. App. 4th 1290 (1997).
141. The mental health agency mistakenly sent the alleged victim's records directly to the
attorney in response to a subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 1294. Because the appeal came before
the court from demurrers sustained without leave to amend, the court of appeal assumed the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. This discussion shall do likewise.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1295.
145. Id.
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and to the extent necessary to ensure defendants' constitutional rights [sic]
to confrontation."'
' 46
In a third area of law, California courts have balanced the
constitutional right to privacy against the state interest of ascertaining the
truth. In civil cases, facilitating the "ascertainment of the truth" is a
compelling interest. 147  The right of discovery, including the right of
access to any information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence,"'148 is the tool designed to facilitate the
ascertainment of truth in civil proceedings.
California courts have consistently held that the right to privacy
restricts the right to discovery. 149  On at least three occasions the
California Supreme Court has ruled that discovery must be limited where
it conflicts with the constitutional right to privacy. Initially, in Valley
Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 the California Supreme Court
applied the newly enacted constitutional right to insulate the bank records
of third parties against an otherwise valid subpoena duces tecum.
151
Although the California Supreme Court acknowledged the subpoenaed
records were "relevant" to claims in the litigation, it held that the new
constitutional right compelled recognition of a limited form of protection
for confidential information given to a bank by its customers. 15z Because
the constitutional right to privacy was implicated by the discovery request,
the court announced that there must be a "careful balancing of the right of
civil litigants to discover relevant facts . . . with the right of bank
customers to maintain reasonable privacy regarding their financial affairs.
"153
Later, the California Supreme Court held that the waiver of privacy
occasioned by the filing of a lawsuit is limited by the constitutional right to
privacy. 154 Subsequently, the court explained that the waiver of privacy
caused by the filing of a lawsuit applied only to those psychiatric
conditions directly relevant to the plaintiff's claims. In so holding, the
146. Susan S., 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1295 (quoting People v. Reber, 177 Cal. App. 3d 523,
532 (1986)).
147. In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970); Garstang v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App.
4th 526, 532 (1995).
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017(a) (Deering 1990).
149. See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 979 (Cal. 1975)
(citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 979.
152. Id. at 978.
153. Id. at 979.
154. In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d at 557.
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court explained that while "other aspects of the [plaintiff's] personality...
may ... be 'relevant' to the substantive interests of litigation," compelled
disclosure of those aspects cannot be required because "the patient is not
obligated to sacrifice all privacy [in order] to seek redress for a specific
mental or emotional injury."
155
The recent case of Tylo v. Superior Court'56 illustrates the balancing
courts perform when confronted with a conflict between the right of
discovery and the constitutional right to privacy. Tylo, seeking damages
for emotional distress, sued a television producer alleging she was
terminated from a role in the television program Melrose Place because
she became pregnant.1 57 During Tylo's deposition, defendant's counsel
posed questions about the physical health of Tylo's husband, the "health"
of Tylo's marriage, and whether Tylo sought psychiatric or psychological
treatment because of marital problems. 18 Tylo objected to these
questions, claiming they violated her and her husband's constitutional right
to privacy. 59 In response, defendants' counsel asserted they were entitled
to ask the questions because Tylo was seeking damages for emotional
distress. Defendants reasoned that, because of the claim of emotional
distress, they had a right to discover any other "stressors" that might have
caused or contributed to Tylo's alleged emotional injuries.
1 6 1
In rejecting the defendants' argument, the court of appeal held that
defendants' discovery rights were limited to information about those
injuries resulting from termination of the contract. 62  Because the
information defendants were seeking was protected by the constitutional
right to privacy, they bore two burdens before they could obtain the
information. First, defendants had to identify the specific ijuries the
plaintiff claimed were caused by termination of the contract.' 63 Second,
they had to demonstrate a nexus between the injuries caused by the
contract termination and those caused by the marital relationship.' 64 Only
155. Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 779 (Cal. 1978) (quoting In re Lifschutz, 467
P.2d at 570).
156. 55 Cal. App. 4th 1379 (1997).
157. Id. at 1382-83.
158. Id. at 1385.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Tylo, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1388.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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then could defendants compel disclosure of the information regarding
emotional distress resulting from the marital relationship.
65
The California courts have developed a principle where the right to
privacy conflicts with rules of discovery. The principle was succinctly
summarized in the recent case of Gallo v. Conigliaro:166  "Even when
discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of
ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must be a
careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the
fundamental right of privacy."'
67
IV. CAN THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
SURVIVE FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY?
This Article advances the proposition that the California
constitutional right to privacy does allow a private figure to recover
damages for publication of confidential medical material obtained from
private sources. This section discusses whether this result can coexist with
the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.
A. Is Confidential Medical Information Obtained From Private
Sources "Lawfully Obtained?"
Under the Daily Mail/Florida Star standard, the first question asked
is whether the information published was "lawfully obtained." In Florida
Star, Justice Marshall stated, "To the extent sensitive information rests in
private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its
nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail
principle the publication of any information so acquired." 1
68
California's constitutional and statutory scheme protecting privacy
and the confidentiality of medical information arguably brings publication
of that information outside of the Daily Mail principle. The argument is
that confidential medical information cannot be "lawfully obtained"
without the patient's permission. 69 California's constitutional guarantee
165. Id.
166. 33 Cal. App. 4th 592 (1995).
167. Id. at 597 (quoting Davis v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1014 (1992)).
168. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (emphasis added).
169. The Florida Star and Daily Mail opinions do not define "lawfully obtained." Such
definition was unnecessary in Daily Mail, because there was no dispute that the information at
issue was "lawfully obtained." Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99-100, 103-04
(1978).
In Florida Star there was some dispute over that issue. The dissenters noted the reporter
admitted she knew she was not supposed to record or report the victim's name. Florida Star,
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of privacy and its statutory provisions-prohibiting the release of
confidential medical information generally and AIDS/HIV information
specifically-all forbid nonconsensual acquisition.1 70  In California,
possession of confidential medical information without authorization is a
misdemeanor, 17 1 a civil wrong, 172 and a violation of the duty of
confidentiality. 173  Whether California can punish publication of
information that was not "lawfully obtained" without violating the First
Amendment is a question the United States Supreme Court has
deliberately left open to conjecture.
174
B. Is the Medical Condition of Private Individuals a
Matter of Public Significance?
The second Daily Mail/Florida Star inquiry is whether the medical
condition of a private figure is a matter of public significance. In two
senses, both illustrated by the Dr. Eldridge hypothetical, the publication of
private medical information about a private figure may concern matters of
public significance.
Publication of the information about Dr. Eldridge educated the public
that HIV can be contracted through circumstances that are not the fault of
the patient. An article about a respected physician in that unhappy position
would enhance the emotional impact and the educational value of a series
seeking to reduce public ignorance about HIV/AIDS and its causes.
Writing a lead sentence stating "A prominent pediatrician recently
contracted HIV" does not have the same resonance as "Dr. Louise
Eldridge, a prominent and well-loved pediatrician, recently learned she
contracted HIV through an operating room accident at Children's
Hospital." By adding the name and personal information about the
491 U.S. at 546 (White, J., dissenting). Based on that admission, the dissenters argued the
posting of the incident report "did not convey to the Star's reporter the idea that 'the
government considered dissemination lawful."' Id. The majority opinion simply does not
address this point.
170. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
171. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
174. The majority opinion in Florida Star declares:
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source,
government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing
publication as well. This issue was raised but not definitively resolved in New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and reserved in Landmark
Communications [Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978)]. We have no
occasion to address it here.
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535, n.8.
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physician so afflicted, the story became more "real" for the Express'
readers.'
75
In this sense publication of information about Dr. Eldridge's illness
fits comfortably within traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. It is
generally agreed that a primary raison d'etre for freedom of speech and
freedom of the press is to facilitate self-governance. 76 The Express story,
by educating the public and influencing public attitudes, ultimately
resulted in beneficial legislation on the subject of AIDS/HIV. Therefore,
the story concerning Dr. Eldridge contributed to discussion of an issue of
public importance, fitting neatly within the self-governance paradigm.
The second way publication of confidential medical information
involves a matter of "public significance" is illustrated by the parental
175. Michael Gartner, the President of NBC News, said this about his decision to name the
alleged victim in the Joseph Kennedy Smith rape case:
Names and facts are news. They add credibility, they round out the story, they
give the viewer or reader information he or she needs to understand issues, to
make up his or her own mind about what's going on. So my prejudice is always
toward telling the viewer all the germane facts that we know.
Michael Gartner, Naming Rape Victims: Usually, There Are Good Reasons to Do It, USA
TODAY, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6A.
176. "The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of
self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from
the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage."
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 9 (1960). "It is the enlightenment function
which constitutes the foundation upon which the First Amendment edifice largely rests."
MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 23 (1984). The United States Supreme
Court has, in several opinions, ascribed the same importance to the "enlightenment function."
In one of the key privacy cases, the Court declared:
[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring him in convenient form the facts of those
operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to
report fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records
and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.
Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally.
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) (emphasis added).
The enlightenment function played a critical role in the Court's resolution of the issues
presented in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 255 (1964). In explaining why
defamation actions against public officials had to proceed under a higher standard for recovery,
the Supreme Court declared:
The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, "presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection .. " [Thus,] we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.
Id. at 270.
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reaction to the knowledge of Dr. Eldridge's illness. Parents have the right
and responsibility to choose the physician treating their children. Before
publication of the story about Dr. Eldridge, those decisions were, arguably,
based on incomplete information. Armed with the information provided
by the Express, some parents undoubtedly would make the decision to
change physicians. While their reaction might be condemned as hysterical
or ignorant, their decision indicates the information published by the
Express was important. The Supreme Court has recognized, in
commercial speech cases, that one function of the First Amendment is to
provide consumers access to the information necessary to make decisions
about where they shop, what they buy, and with whom they do business.
177
The Express article provided consumers with truthful information about
Dr. Eldridge, a person offering a professional service for a fee. It supplied
those consumers with information permitting them to make informed
decisions regarding whether to allow Dr. Eldridge to treat their children.
In this sense, the publication of the information about Dr. Eldridge's
medical condition involves a matter of "public concern."
Countervailing arguments on this question persist. The Supreme
Court carefully noted in both Cox and Florida Star, decisions favoring
freedom of the press over the right to privacy, that the material suppressed
involved operation of government, and more specifically the operation of
the criminal justice system. 7 8 In Cox, the Court delineated the special role
the press plays: "With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the
function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring
to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of
justice."'
179
That special role is not present where the press is reporting
confidential facts about a private individual, concerning a matter where the
individual is not involved in some governmental function. Thus, the First
Amendment interest in protecting publication is not as strong in the Dr.
Eldridge hypothetical as it was in Florida Star or Cox. 18 If that is true,
then the Daily Mail standard should not be applied in the Dr. Eldridge
scenario, because the report does not concern the operation of government.
177. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
178. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 492; Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37.
179. Cox, 420 U.S. at 492 (citation omitted).
180. Professor Chemerinsky has noted the distinction: "First Amendment values are
lessened because there is not the important interest of ensuring that the press feels free to
publish what it learns in public records. Reports on what the government is doing are at the
very core of the First Amendment." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 865.
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In Florida Star, the Supreme Court balked at the notion that
publication of the name of a rape victim is necessarily a matter of public
interest: "[T]he article generally, as opposed to the specific identitv
contained within it, involved a matter of paramount public import .... ,,"19
Likewise, one can question whether the publication of the name of a victim
of HIV, as opposed to general information about how the infection can be
contracted, is protected by the First Amendment.
C. Does California's Constitutional Protection of the Privacy Interests of
Its Citizens Satisfy the Florida Star/Daily Mail Standard?
The foregoing discussion reveals that questions remain whether
publication of confidential medical information about private figures is
protected by the First Amendment. Absent patient consent, acquisition of
confidential medical information is "unlawful" in California; therefore
publication of that information may fall outside the Daily Mail principle.
Even if publication falls within that principle, it may not be
constitutionally protected because the name of a private figure, or the fact
she has a disease, is not necessarily a matter of public interest. Because
these questions remain unanswered, 18 it will be assumed for purposes of
this discussion that publication of confidential medical information about a
private figure is protected by the First Amendment. Given that
assumption, does California's constitutional right to privacy violate the
First Amendment because it would allow that individual to collect
damages from the press for invasion of privacy? In short, can California's
constitutional guarantee survive the kind of scrutiny given the statute in
Florida Star?
California's constitutional right to privacy is, at a minimum, a state
interest "of the highest order."' 183 California has elevated the right to
181. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37 (emphasis added).
182. These questions beg for resolution. Should the state be allowed to punish the media
where the information published is unlawfully obtained? Does the First Amendment protect the
media should they choose to reveal private facts about a private figure? The holding in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974), might be read as suggesting the answer to this last question
is "no."
However, Gertz involved false speech, which is not protected by the First Amendment.
Id. The Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to hold that the press can never be punished for
publishing true information. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 491; Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532. The
possibility of doing so, however, is especially unlikely under current First Amendment
jurisprudence: "[The Court's rulings reflect the principle that the First Amendment must
virtually always protect the publication of true information." CHEMEKINSKY, supra note 3, at
864.
183. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
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privacy to the highest status by enshrining it in the state constitution.18 4 In
so doing, voters declared that the ability to control dissemination of
confidential personal information is a fundamental interest. California
courts, through their holdings restricting discovery, the introduction of
evidence at trial, and the publication of confidential information, have
made it clear that they view the constitutional right to privacy as
fundamental. l85  Clearly, protection of privacy is an interest more
important than a state's interest in protecting a person's reputation.
The third and final Hill inquiry is whether the method California has
selected to protect constitutional privacy solves the problems with the
Florida statute identified by the Court in Florida Star. In Florida Star the
majority faulted the statute because it utilized a negligence per se
standard."' Under that structure, the Court observed, liability could be
imposed "whether the identity of the victim is already known throughout
the community; whether the victim has voluntarily called public attention
to the offense; or whether the identity of the victim has otherwise become
a reasonable subject of public concern .... ",187
California does not use a negligence per se standard in privacy cases.
Indeed, one cannot state a cause of action for invasion of constitutional
privacy where the published information is matter of public record or
widely known. 18 California's privacy right does not allow imposition of
liability upon the press for the publication of information where the
plaintiff has called public attention to himself.189 The Hill opinion makes
that clear, discussing with approval the common law invasion of privacy
standard that "the plaintiff in an invasion of privacy case must have
conducted himself 'or herself in a manner consistent with an actual
expectation of privacy ... ,,190 Finally, the state constitutional protection
184. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
185. See supra Part II.
186. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
187. Id. at 539.
188. In Hill, the California Supreme Court held that an essential element of a state
constitutional cause of action is "a reasonable expectation of privacy." Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994). There can be no such expectation
where the information revealed is a matter of public record. In Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d
912 (Cal. 1969), the court held plaintiffs could not state a cause of action for tortious invasion of
privacy where the information published came from a police blotter. The court observed that
"such events would already have been matters of public record.... Thus we are not faced with
an article which intrudes deeply into the children's privacy by revealing incidents of a wholly
private or confidential nature." Id. at 924 (citations omitted). It is unlikely the court would find
a reasonable expectation of privacy can exist in situations where the matters published are
obtained from public records.
189. Hill, 865 P.2d at 648.
190. Id.
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of privacy offers no relief where the published information concerns a
person who has "become a reasonable subject of public concern."
191
The United States Supreme Court also faulted the statute in Florida
Star because it applied only to instruments of "mass communication."'
192
Unlike the Florida statute, California's constitutional right to privacy is not
underinclusive, because it applies to anyone who releases confidential
medical information without authorization. 193  In Hill, the California
Supreme Court ruled that California's constitutional right to privacy
restricts the rights of private parties as well as government. 194 The court
held that Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right
of action against private as well as government entities. 195 In reaching this
conclusion, the court made clear that any person who publishes
confidential information protected by the California constitutional
guarantee is liable.
196
The Hill opinion observes that the common law invasion of privacy
tort requires the disclosure to be widely published and not confined to a
few persons or limited circumstances.1 7  In contrast, the California
constitutional guarantee prevents any misuse of information gathered for
one purpose in order to serve other purposes. 198  Under that rubric,
"sensitive personal information may be misused even if its disclosure is
limited.' ' 1 9 A declaration in a footnote to the Hill opinion is especially
relevant to the protection of Dr. Eldridge's confidential medical
information: "Particularly when professional or fiduciary relationships
premised on confidentiality are at issue (such as doctor and patient or
psychotherapist and client), the state constitutional right to privacy may be
invaded by a less-than-public dissemination of information."
200
191. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539.
192. Id. at 540, 541-42.
193. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(a) (Deering 1990).
194. Hill, 865 P.2d 633, 633-44 (Cal. 1994).
195. Id. at 644.
196. To paraphrase Justice Marshall, California's constitutional protection applies to the
small time disseminator as well as the media giant. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540.
197. Hill, 865 P.2d at 648-49.
198. Id. at 649.
199. Id.
200. Id. at n.7. Later in that note, the Court does intimate it is most concerned about
widespread dissemination: "Although the Privacy Initiative reveals no voter intent to extend the
common law to create a cause of action for mere gossip, in an age of oral mass media (e.g.,
radio), widespread oral disclosure may tread upon our state constitutional right to privacy as
readily as written dissemination." Id. This part of the California court's opinion, if it is indeed
incorporated in the constitutional guarantee, might be susceptible to the charge that it is
underinclusive. The opinion declares the constitutional guarantee applies only to mass
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Subsequent lower court cases demonstrate that the California
constitutional tort applies its "prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime
disseminator as well as the media giant."201 In Susan S. v. Israels,20 2 a
case decided after Hill, the California Court of Appeal concluded that
dissemination by a single lawyer to a defense expert could constitute a
violation of the constitutional right to privacy.20 3 The court held that the
plaintiff stated a valid cause of action under the California Constitution
where she alleged a defense attorney read her confidential mental health
records, transmitted those records to a defense expert psychiatrist, and
used the information to cross examine the plaintiff in criminal trial.
204
Among other things, defendants argued there was no violation because
they did not "broadcast" the information.20 In response to that contention,
the court noted that "Susan S.'s cause of action for invasion of her
constitutional right of privacy does not depend on the 'publication' or
'broadcast' of her mental health records but rests on Israels' conduct in
reading those records. '2°6  The court held that a stranger's unauthorized
reading and dissemination of a person's mental health records is a serious
invasion of the person's privacy.207
In an earlier case, Cutter v. Brownbridge,208 the California Court of
Appeal held that publication of confidential mental health information in a
declaration used only in a court proceeding violated the constitutional right
publication, not small time dissemination. Id.
There are three responses to that charge. First, the distinction drawn under article I,
section 1 differs markedly from the statute stricken in Florida Star. This is not a prohibition
that, in the words of Justice Scalia, society is prepared to impose upon the press but not upon
itself. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring). The constitutional guarantee of
privacy applies to the press and anyone who publishes private information in a manner that
results in widespread distribution. Id. Second, a limitation to widespread publication would
represent the California court's insistence that a constitutional violation involve the likelihood
of serious harm to the emotional sensibilities of the victim. Third, it is important to note that
this limitation is set out in a footnote and is clearly dicta. The California court was deciding
whether the NCAA, a private entity, could violate the privacy guarantee. The NCAA was not
the "small time disseminator" referenced by Marshall and Scalia. The clear mandates of the
statutes regarding the confidentiality of medical records are that individuals can violate the right
to privacy concerning those records. Given the importance the California courts have attached
to that right over the years, it is quite possible the California high court would hold an individual
discussing confidential medical information with a plaintiffs neighbors and acquaintances
could be sued under the constitutional guarantee.
201. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540.
202. 55 Cal. App. 4th 1290, 1293 (1997).
203. Id. at 1293.
204. Id. at 1294.
205. Id. at 1299.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1298.
208. 183 Cal. App. 3d 836 (1986).
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to privacy. 209 In that case, the patient Cutter brought a lawsuit against his
psychotherapist. The complaint alleged the psychotherapist executed a
written declaration describing his diagnosis of the plaintiff and revealing
damaging personal details learned as a result of his treatment of Cutter.
That declaration was used in a motion by Cutter's former wife to terminate
his visitation privileges.
The court held that a psychotherapist's diagnosis and other details of
his professional relationship with a patient are protected by the
constitutional right to privacy. 211 The court then found that voluntary
unauthorized disclosure of mental health information by a psychiatrist,
even if done only in a court proceeding, violates the right to privacy.
2 12
Thus, it is clear California's constitutional right to privacy is not an
underinclusive remedy. California has anticipated and answered Justice
Scalia's criticism of the Florida statute. California's constitutional
guarantee of privacy is a prohibition society has applied to itself as well as
the press. It is indeed a statue protecting an interest of "the highest order."
V. CONCLUSION
California's constitutional right to privacy would allow Dr. Eldridge
to recover damages for the publication of her confidential medical records.
This Article has argued that awarding damages to a private individual does
not violate the First Amendment because the constitutional right to privacy
is a fundamental interest, and a state enforces that right in a manner
consistent with the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Florida
Star, Cox, and Daily Mail.
Thus far, this Article has confined its discussion to an analysis of the
case law. But what of the important First Amendment concerns
underlying that case law? It is fair to say the primary concern of the
United States Supreme Court in addressing the clash between privacy and
freedom of the press is avoiding strictures that will chill the ability and
willingness of the press to print true information about matters of public
interest. This was the case in Cox, where the Court confronted a rule
209. Id.
210. Id. at 840.
211. Id. at 843.
212. Id. at 847. The court held that a psychotherapist who voluntarily reveals confidential
information does so at his or her peril. Id. It held that where information is sought from a
psychotherapist, an individual should first invoke the statutes extending an evidentiary privilege
to confidential communications between a patient and his or her psychotherapist. Id. This
would allow the courts to strike a proper balance between the patient's constitutional right to
privacy and the state's interest in ascertaining truth in judicial proceedings. Id. at 845-46.
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making information available to the press but forbidding its publication if
offensive to the sensibilities of a reasonable person:
Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform
citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law.
The rule would invite timidity and self-censorship and very
likely lead to the suppression of many items that would
otherwise be published and that should be made available to the
public.
213
The same concern underlies the decision in Florida Star, where the Court
said one consideration mandating invalidation of the statute was the
timidity and self-censorship that might result from punishing the media for
publishing "certain truthful information."
214
This concern about chilling the press from publishing information
that should be made available to the public is minimized by California's
constitutional privacy provision. First, the right to privacy onl, protects
information where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.2 5 Hence,
publication of information already in the public domain, or of information
gathered from public documents, cannot violate the right to privacy.
216
What remains is the argument that protection of privacy will unduly
chill the press because it allows punishment for publication of true
information. The chilling effect of California's constitutional protection of
privacy will be minimal. The constitutional right to privacy only protects
information when "well established norms recognize the need to maximize
individual control over its dissemination and use . . .,,217 This standard
creates a limited universe of protected information. If information is not
protected by common law, constitutional law, or statutes, it is not protected
by the right of privacy. 2 18 These are sources of law readily available and
accessible to editors, publishers, and their advisors in cases where
questions concerning publication arise. Thus, editors can easily ascertain
213. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added).
214. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535.
215. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.
216. Id. In Kapellas v. Kofinan, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969), the California Supreme Court
held an editorial disclosing information from police records about the arrests of a politician's
children did not violate the common law right to privacy. Id. In so holding, the court said the
editorial did not intrude into the children's privacy because the events were "already matters of
public record." Id. at 924. Kapellas cites several California cases concluding that reporting
about matters of public record does not violate the common law right to privacy. Id. Given this
long history, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to matters of public
record.
217. Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
218. Id. at 654-55.
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whether confidential information about private figures involves a "legally
cognizable privacy right."
Under the California Constitution, whether a legally cognizable
privacy right exists is a question of law committed to the court. This
addresses two important constitutional concerns. First, determination of
this question will not be left to the vagaries of jury determination. A
consistent theme in press freedom jurisprudence generally is a concern that
juries will punish the press with damage awards for publicizing unpopular
views or attacking popular figures. The lack of clear standards to guide
jury deliberations contributes to this concern.
By making the determination of a legally cognizable privacy interest
a question of law, the California Supreme Court has eliminated this
concern. Juries do not determine whether a legally cognizable privacy
interest is involved. Judges, who are presumably more attuned to the
important constitutional concerns posed by privacy litigation, make that
determination. If they are wrong, their judgments are subject to
independent review on appeal, insuring proper respect for the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
A second concern about the chilling effect arises from the costs
associated with defending litigation. These costs can be substantial.
California's standard promises quick resolution in those instances where
no legally cognizable privacy interest exists. Those cases can and should
be disposed of through demurrers and motions for summary judgment-
tools that minimize the financial burden imposed on the press by litigation.
Discovery, and the financial costs it imposes on the press, will be limited
by the speedy resolution of this threshold question. Because this is a
question of law, a conscientious judge could delay discovery until she has
made that initial determination, further reducing the potential for chilling
effect.
21
219. Id. at 657.
220. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
221. Two California Supreme Court cases have followed the lead of the United States
Supreme Court, favoring quick resolution of speech related litigation. In Good Gov't Group v.
Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1978), the California Supreme Court held that summary
judgment is a favored remedy where First Amendment rights are implicated by a lawsuit. Id. at
578. The court stated a trial court is obligated, in public official libel cases, to determine
whether there is a sufficient showing of malice before allowing submission of the issue to a jury.
Id at 576. See also Desert Sun Publ'g Co. v. Superior Court, 976 Cal. App. 3d 49 (1979).
In Okun v. Superior Court, 629 P:2d 1369 (Cal. 1981), the California Supreme Court held
a trial court can, and should, sustain a demurrer without leave to amend to avoid the chilling
effect of lawsuits on the exercise of First Amendment rights. Id. at 1380. The demurrer is an
even more effective antidote to the chilling effect of lawsuits because it is resolved based solely
on the allegations contained in the pleadings. In those cases where courts grant demurrers
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Obviously, this Article cannot claim that the right to privacy under
the California Constitution carries no threat of chilling speech. Litigation
will result, and the mere threat of litigation might chill some press activity.
However, California voters, with the assistance of the courts, have struck
an appropriate balance between the right to privacy and freedom of the
press. Governmental intrusion on editorial discretion is minimal, and the
scope of that intrusion is limited to a discrete, readily ascertainable class of
information.
Perhaps most importantly, the information protected by California's
constitutional right to privacy is not the kind of information that "should
be made available to the public." 222 The right to privacy does not protect
information emanating from public proceedings, nor does it extend to
information gleaned from public records. 223  Privacy protection is
extended only to confidential, intimate personal information, which most
people feel should not be made available to the public absent the subject's
consent. Given the important, fundamental interests advanced by
recognition of a right to control dissemination of intimate and confidential
personal information, and the measures that protect those interests, this
Article demonstrates that California's constitutional right to privacy strikes
an appropriate accommodation with the right to freedom of the press.
without leave to amend, little or no discovery will take place.
Any informational privacy claim potentially conflicts with the right of freedom of the
press. Whether the information published involves a legally cognizable privacy interest is a
question of law. Application of the principle and remedies announced in Good Gov 't Group and
Okun is both appropriate and necessary where informational privacy claims are made.
222. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
223. Id. at 495.
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